We apply a generalized quantum game formalism to the phenomena of quantum cloning and quantum state estimation. We find that both phenomena can be usefully viewed as quantum games. We compute the corresponding Nash equilibria and payoffs for both phenomena. Our work also provides a new perspective on quantum cryptography. *
The topic of quantum games is a new area of study within quantum information, and its potential usefulness and consequences are still being explored and understood [1, 2, 3] . This paper argues that, in addition to the efficiency benefits of playing games quantum mechanically [4] , game-theoretic language and techniques are well-suited to deal with situations of conflict where one player's loss means another player's gain. This scenario is particularly important in cryptography, since one can always imagine that the cryptographer and the adversary (i.e. enemy) are playing a two-player zero-sum game. The impossibility of achieving perfect quantum cloning and the impossibility of distinguishing arbitrary states, are the two pillars that render quantum cryptography possible. It would therefore be interesting to cast these concepts in a game-theoretic framework, and determine the corresponding equilibrium points and payoffs. This is the goal of the present paper.
We start by defining the rules of the game of quantum state estimation. Player II chooses an arbitrary pure state |ψ ∈ C 2 . He then sends |ψ ⊗N to player I and |ψ to the referee. Player I's task after receiving the N qubits from player II, is to perform a measurement on them. Based on the outcome, player I sends a pure state |φ ∈ C 2 to the referee. For example, if player I decides to use the set of POVM operators {M m } to do the measurement, and if he associates state |φ m to measurement outcome m, the final state that he sends back to the referee will be m tr[M m ρM † m ]|φ m φ m | where ρ = (|ψ ψ|) ⊗N . After receiving the two qubits from player I and player II, we imagine that the referee uses the SWAP-test [5] on them: if the test says that the two states are equal, he awards a payoff of 1 to player I and −1 to player II. Otherwise, player I gets a payoff of −1 and player II a payoff of 1. In terms of expected payoff, this game is equivalent to the game discussed in Ref. [6] .
The above game is a generalization of games considered in Ref. [4] . One particular difference is that the referee no longer issues, and receives at the end, all the qubits employed in the game. More fundamentally, however, this game of state estimation involves communication via qubits. Comparing to the strategy sets discussed in Ref. [4] , we place a severe restriction on players' strategy sets. This is justifiable because only a particular quantum operation is of interest -these restrictions then render the calculation possible. The so-called Minmax theorem is well-known in classical game theory: we now show that a generalized form of Minmax theorem holds for the quantum game.
Theorem 1 For the above game of quantum state estimation,
where Ω I and Ω II are the strategic sets for player I and player II respectively and P (χ, ξ) is the payoff for player I.
Proof: We treat the case for N = 1. Cases for arbitrary N can be treated similarly. We note that the proof is similar to that of theorem 2 in Ref. [4] . For N = 1, we use 3 qubits to play this game. We assume that the referee generates the state ρ = |000 000| and sends the first two qubits to player II and the last qubit to player I. Player II now has the freedom to operate on them by transforming the state to W ⊗ W ρW † ⊗ W † where W is an arbitrary unitary map chosen by him. Player II then sends the first qubit to the referee and and the second qubit to player I. Player I measures the qubit sent from player II (the second qubit) with respect to a set of POVM operators {M m } and then applies the unitary map U m on the qubit he received from the referee (the third qubit) if the measurement outcome is m. He then submits the qubits to the referee. After receiving all three qubits, the referee does a SWAP-test on the first and the third qubits. We let {S k }, k ∈ {0, 1} be the set of POVM operators corresponding to the SWAP-test, with outcome 0 being the answer YES and outcome 1 being the answer NO. Denoting S †
We now use a fixed set of operators {E α }, E α ∈ R 16 which form a basis for the set of operators on the state space. The payoff can then be written as
We denote the set of allowable χ by Ω ′ I and the set of allowable ξ by Ω ′ II . We further denote the convex closure of Ω ′ I by Ω I and that of Ω ′ II by Ω II . We note that Ω ′ I = Ω I and Ω II corresponds to allowing player II to submit probabilistic ensembles of pure states. These are referred to as mixed strategies in classical game theory. The theorem now follows by invoking the (classical) Minimax theorem in Ref. [7] because Ω k s are compact and convex, and P (χ, ξ) is linear and continuous in χ and ξ. Q.E.D.
With the above theorem in mind, we are now ready to compute the Nash equilibria for this quantum state estimation game. First we denote the value of the game, i.e., max χ∈Ω I min ξ∈Ω II P (χ, ξ), by ν. As shown in Ref. [6] , where ξ * is the strategy of generating the pure state with uniform probability with respect to the polarization direction, max χ∈Ω I P (χ, ξ * ) = (N + 1)/(N + 2). Hence, ν ≤ (N + 1)/(N + 2). We now show that ν is actually equal to (N + 1)/(N + 2). From Theorem 1, we learn that for any χ ∈ Ω I , there exists a λ such that P (χ, ξ) ≥ λ for all ξ ∈ Ω II . Therefore, the problem of obtaining an optimal strategy for player I reduces to the problem of maximizing λ for all ξ ∈ Ω II . Since we have restricted player II's set of strategies to be the set of any probabilistic ensemble of pure states, the problem can once again be reduced to maximizing λ, given that player II can only choose one particular pure state instead of a probabilistic ensemble of them.
We will now solve this problem of obtaining an optimal strategy for player I, or equivalently maximizing λ, by generalizing the method presented in Ref. [8] . For an arbitrary state |ψ , the expected payoff for player I is
Without loss of generality, we may rewrite the above as
for some σ known to player I, such that U m σU † m = |φ m φ m | and (U σU † ) ⊗N = ρ for some U which is unknown to him. We now imagine that player I selects at random a unitary operator W . He applies W ⊗N to the qubits player II sent him, measures them with respect to the POVM {M m }, and finally applies W † to the pure state he generates, before sending it to the referee. We note that if the original strategy is optimizing, this modified version of it still is. The expected payoff for him will now be:
where dW denotes the integration with respect to the normalized Haar measure of the unitary group of C 2 . Upon substituting W U → W , the unknown U drops out and we get:
This is Equation (1) in Ref. [8] . Therefore, the rest of these authors' analysis follows and hence ν = (N + 1)/(N + 2). The optimal strategy found in Example A of Ref. [8] , also gives us a strategy at the Nash equilibrium after some modification. Explicitly, denoting the POVM measurement found there by {M m } and letting |φ m be the state to be submitted if the measurement outcome is m, the Nash equilibrium corresponds to picking at random a unitary map W , applying W ⊗N to the state to be measured, then submitting W † |φ m if the outcome is m. For player II, since max χ∈Ω I P (χ, ξ * ) = (N + 1)/(N + 2) = ν where ξ * is the strategy of generating the pure state with uniform probability with respect to the polarization direction, ξ * is a strategy at Nash equilibrium for him.
To summarize, we have succeeded in finding one particular strategy profile at Nash equilibrium. However, do we need to worry about other strategy profiles also at Nash equilibrium? The answer is No because of the following theorem:
Theorem 2 In a two-player zero-sum game, let (χ 1 , ξ 1 ) and (χ 2 , ξ 2 ) be two equilibrium pairs. Then 1. (χ 1 , ξ 2 ) and (χ 2 , ξ 1 ) are also equilibrium pairs, and
Proof: The proof can be found in Ref. [9] .
Q.E.D.
Unlike in general games where one should worry about multiple Nash equilibria, a strategy at equilibrium is as good as any others in a two-player zero-sum game. Therefore, finding one is enough as far as playing the game is concerned. We now consider the case N = 1 as an example. In Ref. [6] , with the assumption that player II adopts the strategy of choosing the pure state with uniform probability with respect to the polarization direction, Massar and Popescu found that the optimal strategy for player I is to always measure the qubit along the z-axis and to submit to the referee a qubit polarized along the +z or −z direction according to the outcome of the measurement. However this is not a strategy at equilibrium: if player II only chooses qubits polarized along the x-axis, the expected payoff for player I will only be 1/2 instead of 2/3, which is the value of the game. Player I should instead start by picking at random a unitary map W , and apply it to the state before measuring it along the z-axis -he should then submit W † | + z or W † | − z according to the measurement outcome.
We now turn to a game-theoretic discussion of quantum cloning. In Ref. [10] , Werner introduces the quantum cloning game, and optimizes the cloning map with respect to a specfic measure of success. He also states that it would be interesting to search for the equilibrium points of this game. We will now show that Werner's cloning map is in fact a strategy at Nash equilibrium. The proof proceeds as follows. We imagine a game where player II chooses a pure state |ψ ∈ H where H = C d , and he sends the state (|ψ ψ|) ⊗N to player I and the state (|ψ ψ|) ⊗M to the referee. After receiving the state from player II, player I designs a device that takes as input (|ψ ψ|) ⊗N and outputs a state σ such that σ is a density operator in H ⊗M . He then sends σ to the referee. Finally, the referee uses the SWAP-test on (|ψ ψ|) ⊗M and σ. If they pass the test, he awards a payoff of 1 to player I and −1 to player II, and he awards −1 to player I and 1 to player II otherwise. A slight variation of Theorem 1 tells us the following equality which is also the value of this game:
Since the strategic sets are compact and P (·, ·) continuous, the value can be written as sup χ∈Ω I inf ξ∈Ω II P (χ, ξ). Furthermore, since Ω II denotes the set of probabilistic ensembles of pure states, the infimum is attained by some pure states. Hence the value can once again be rewritten as sup
where Ξ is the set of strategies whereby player II can only choose one particular pure state, rather than a probabilistic mixture of many. The proof is now complete since the quantity in Eq. (1) is the measure Werner identified for optimization (see Eq. (10) in Ref. [10] ). Therefore, following the analysis of Werner [10] , the value of this game is
and the unique strategy at equilibrium for player I is the following operation:
where s M is the orthogonal projection of H M onto its Bose space. We claim that a strategy at equilibrium for player II in the quantum cloning game corresponds to generating a pure state with uniform probability with respect to the unitary group of H. To show this, we first of all denote this strategy by ξ * and let λ := P (χ * , ξ * ) = sup χ∈Ω I P (χ, ξ * ). We also denote the map corresponding to χ * as T * . In other words, λ = dU tr[ρ . We let T be the average of T * with respect to sitewise rotations, i.e.
T is again optimizing with respect to the strategy ξ * as well as being covariant and hence is a universal cloner. Therefore, λ = tr[ρ ⊗M T (ρ ⊗N )] for some pure state ρ, which, as shown previously, must be less than
. Therefore, the proof of the claim follows.
In summary we have discussed the games of quantum state estimation and quantum cloning, and have found the corresponding Nash equilibria in them. In particular, to protect against the attacks of cloning and state estimation in a cryptographic setting, the best strategy for a two-level system is to issue a state with uniform probability with respect to the unitary group of C 2 , in accordance with our intuition. The concepts and techniques developed here should be useful in other such adversarial scenarios. We also note that although we have restricted the referee's action to be physical, hence rendering some situations impossible [11] , this need not be the case. In fact, the Minmax theorem holds as long as the payoff function is rendered linear with respect to χ and ξ. We conclude by noting that it is well-known among computer scientists that bounds on classical computing can be proved by classical game-theoretic techniques [12] . So could quantum games pay back this debt by passing similar benefits back over to quantum computation? The answer awaits further investigation.
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